The Lesser Battle

Identity

Segment range snp4.12:1.1–17.4. Sn 878–894 (17 verses). Received title Cūḷaviyūhasutta (also Cūḷabyūha in Eastern editions) — "Smaller Deployment / Array." Paired with Snp 4.13 Mahāviyūha ("Larger Deployment") as the AV's twin sectarian-dispute analysis suttas. The title-word vyūha is classical military vocabulary for a battle-formation (cakra-vyūha, padma-vyūha in the Mahābhārata); the sutta casts philosophical debate as a military array, with each sectarian arrayed in their own position attacking the others.

4.12 is the AV's most concentrated attack on dogmatic debate as such. No causal-chain analysis (unlike 4.11), no meditative-attainment peak, no personal sage-description — the sutta is a pure critique of the structure of sectarian disputation: how claimants call each other fools while each claiming expertise, and how the pluralism of "truths" arises from perception-based construction rather than from objective diversity in the world.

Text and form

Triṣṭubh throughout (Norman 2001). No narrative frame in the Pāli; no speaker-tags. Three asymmetric Q-A rounds:

• Q1 (vv. 1–2) — the opening dilemma: each sectarian rejects the others as fools but claims expertise; whose speech is true?
• A1 (vv. 3–5) — the Buddha's ad hominem reversal: if not-accepting-another's-teaching makes one a fool, then all the sectarians are fools (they all reject each other); if holding-one's-own-view makes one pure-in-wisdom, then none of them lack wisdom. The Buddha refuses both horns: he does not say "this is correct" of what the fools mutually assert.
• Q2 (v. 6) — a second probe: what some call true, others call hollow; why do they not agree?
• A2 (v. 7) — the one-truth thesis: ekañ hi saccaṁ na dutīyam atthi — "there is one truth, not a second; they proclaim their various [positions as] truths, that is why they do not say the same thing."
• Q3 (v. 8) — why do they proclaim various truths? Are the truths actually many, or are they simply following speculation?
• A3 (vv. 9–17) — the extended epistemological critique, the sutta's longest verse-run. Multiple truths arise not from objective diversity but from perception-based speculation (v. 9); sectarians show contempt relying on diṭṭha-suta-sīlavata-muta (v. 10); each claims expertise on the very ground by which they call the other a fool (v. 11); they speak from conceit, drunk on their own view (v. 12); "here alone is purity," they say (v. 15, echoing Snp 4.8:1.1); having abandoned all judgments, the sage does not bring about quarrel (v. 17).

Content

"Each abiding in his own view, contending, the 'experts' say various things: 'whoever knows this way understands the dhamma; whoever rejects this is incomplete.' Contending, they dispute; they say 'the other is a fool, a non-expert.' Which assertion of these is true? For all of them claim to be experts."

The Buddha answers: if not accepting another's teaching makes one a fool, then all these are fools — for all abide in their own views. But if one is cleansed by one's own view — pure-in-wisdom, expert, wise — then none of them is deficient in wisdom, for their view too has been likewise adopted. I do not say "this is correct" of what these fools mutually say. They each have made their own view the truth; that is why they regard the other as a fool.

What some call true, others call hollow and false; contending, they dispute. Why do these ascetics not say the same thing? Ekañ hi saccaṁ na dutīyam atthi — "there is one truth, not a second, concerning which a wise person would not dispute with another wise person." But these proclaim their various [positions as] truths; that is why they do not say the same thing.

Why, then, do they proclaim various truths — are they really many, or do they follow their own speculation? There are not truly many various truths in the world apart from perception. Having fabricated speculation (takka) regarding views, they speak of two things: "truth" and "falsehood." Based on the seen, the heard, the precept-and-vow, the sensed, relying on these, they show contempt; standing in judgment, exulting, they say "the other is a fool, a non-expert."

On whatever ground they call the other a fool, on that very ground they call themselves expert. Claiming themselves expert on their own say-so, they despise the other — yet they say the very same kind of thing. Perfect according to his transgressive view, drunk with conceit, full of arrogance, self-anointed in his own mind — for such is the view he has adopted. "Here alone is purity," they say; they deny that there is purification in other teachings. Standing in judgment, measuring by one's own standard, one moves forward into dispute in the world. But having abandoned all judgments, a person does not bring about quarrel in the world.

Key passages

v. 2 (Sn 879) — the framing question.

Evampi viggayha vivādayanti, / Bālo paro akkusaloti cāhu; / Sacco nu vādo katamo imesaṁ, / Sabbeva hīme kusalāvadānā.

Thus contending they dispute: "the other is a fool, a non-expert!" Which assertion of these is true, for all of them claim to be experts?

The sutta's setup. The term kusalā vadānā ("expert-claimers") is used ironically throughout 4.12 — those who call themselves experts are being mocked.

v. 4 (Sn 881) — the samatta crux.

Sandiṭṭhiyā ceva na vīvadātā, / Saṁsuddhapaññā kusalā mutīmā; / Na tesaṁ koci parihīnapañño, / Diṭṭhī hi tesampi tathā samattā.

But if by his own view one is cleansed — pure-in-wisdom, expert, wise — then none of them is deficient in wisdom, for their view too is likewise samatta.

Samatta has two live etymologies: (a) from sama + -tta (abstract noun) — "equal / likewise valid"; (b) from saṁ-ātta (past-participle of sam-ā-dā-) — "likewise adopted, taken up." Norman (2001 p. 363), following Smith, prefers (b); Fronsdal reads (a); Bodhi joins Norman. The readings give sharply different philosophical weights — (a) says all views are equally valid by their own criterion; (b) says all views are equally held in the adoptive mode. Reading (b) is AV-consistent: the sutta is about how views are held, not about the validity of their content. The atta < ātta ("taken up") reading here is continuous with the attā nirattā formula at 4.3, 4.10, 4.14, 4.15 — all reading -tta as past-participle rather than as abstract-noun.

v. 7 (Sn 884) — the one-truth thesis.

Ekañ hi saccaṁ na dutīyam atthi, / Yasmiṁ pajā no vivade pajānaṁ; / Nānā te saccāni sayaṁ thunanti, / Tasmā na ekaṁ samaṇā vadanti.

There is one truth, not a second, regarding which a wise person would not dispute with another. But these proclaim their various [positions as] truths; that is why ascetics do not say the same thing.

The sutta's central doctrinal claim. Ekañ hi saccaṁ na dutīyam atthi is the AV's most positive-seeming truth-statement — an ostensible affirmation of one truth against sectarian pluralism. Read in context, however, the verse does not say "the Buddha's own position is the one truth"; it says that there is one truth and those who know it do not dispute about it, while the sectarians who do dispute are proclaiming their variously-adopted positions as truths. The thesis is consistent with the AV's apophatic stance: the goal-figure (muni, dhono, upasanta) holds no disputable position and therefore has no grounds for dispute. The "one truth" is not a positive doctrinal content but the absence-of-position the dispute-analysis diagnoses.

v. 9 (Sn 886) — the epistemological core.

Na h'eva saccāni bahūni nānā, / Aññatra saññāya niccāni loke; / Takkañca diṭṭhīsu pakappayitvā, / Saccaṁ musāti dvayadhammamāhu.

There are not truly many various [eternal] truths in the world apart from perception. Having fabricated speculation on views, they speak of two things — "truth" and "falsehood."

Aññatra saññāya niccāni loke — "apart from perception, [there are not] many eternal truths in the world." The AV's most directly epistemological statement: the plurality of "truths" arises not from objective diversity but from saññā-based cognitive construction. Takka ("speculation, reasoning") generates the two-fold sacca / musā ("true / false") distinction; apart from perception, the manifold does not objectively exist. The verse links 4.12 to 4.11 v. 13's saññā-nidānā papañca-saṅkhā — both suttas locate the root of philosophical proliferation in perception.

v. 10 (Sn 887) — the diṭṭha-suta-sīlavata-mute formula.

Diṭṭhe sute sīlavate mute vā, / Ete ca nissāya vimānadassī; / Vinicchaye ṭhatvā pahassamāno, / Bālo paro akkusaloti cāha.

In regard to the seen, heard, precept-and-vow, or sensed — relying on these, he shows contempt; standing in judgment, exulting, he says "the other is a fool, a non-expert."

Pāda a is verbatim with Snp 4.4:3.2 and Snp 4.5:2.2 — the three-AV-sutta stable formula. Lee's "beliefs-traditions-rationales" reading of the four-claim formula here receives its third parallel attestation in the same position — the diṭṭhi-debate context consistently uses the triplet as bases-of-ascetic-claim rather than as cognitive-process vocabulary (see Part II 4.4 Choice-points).

v. 17 (Sn 894) — the closing.

Hitvāna sabbāni vinicchayāni, / Na medhagaṁ kubbati jantu loke.

Having abandoned all judgments, a person does not bring about quarrel in the world.

The AV's signature anti-dispute closure. The muni / dhono / upasanta does not bring about quarrel — not by winning arguments, not by refuting positions, but by holding no judgments to defend.

Choice-points

v. 1, akevalī. Niddesa (I 287) glosses akevalī as "not-fully-accomplished, incomplete." The term is Jain-technical: in Jainism, kevalin is the omniscient liberated one (kevala-jñāna, complete knowledge). The AV's use of akevalī as a rejection-epithet in a sectarian-debate context has cross-sectarian resonance — Lee 2024 (p. 364 n. 18) suggests the term "may once have been a trans-sectarian concept before it was claimed by Jain traditions." The AV's verse uses the Jain technical term ironically: sectarians call each other akevalī ("incomplete / not fully-accomplished") while each claiming expertise.

v. 4, samatta. See Key passages. The ātta past-participle reading (Norman, Bodhi) is AV-consistent; the sama-tta abstract-noun reading (Fronsdal) gives a different philosophical weight but sits less well with the AV's atta nirattā formula family.

v. 10, diṭṭha-suta-sīlavata-mute. Same Lee / published-consensus crux as at Snp 4.3, 4.4, 4.5. Lee's claim-bases reading ("beliefs, traditions, precept-and-vow, rationales") has its third verbatim attestation here.

Questioner identity. The Pāli is silent. Pj II reads the sutta as part of the Mahāsamaya (DN 20) cycle with the Buddha answering via a mano-mayaṁ buddhaṁ (mind-created Buddha) — the same framing convention as at Snp 4.10 and 4.11. The Yizujing's parallel supplies a Meng-guan brahmin frame (see Cross-recensional witnesses).

Vocabulary and commentary

Lexical profile. The AV's diṭṭhi-debate lexicon concentrates here as at 4.3, 4.4, 4.5: sandiṭṭhi ("one's own view"), samatta / ātta ("adopted / taken up"), diṭṭha-suta-sīlavata-muta (the four-claim formula), bāla / akusala ("fool / non-expert"), vinicchaya ("judgment"), takka ("speculation"), atisāra-diṭṭhi ("transgressive view"), sandiṭṭhi-rāga ("passion for one's own view"). The sutta is 4.4–4.5's vocabulary applied to a different analytic target: the structure of sectarian debate as such, rather than the mechanism of view-attachment.

Cross-AV bonds: diṭṭhe sute sīlavate mute vā (v. 10 = 4.4:3.2 = 4.5:2.2) — the three-sutta formula. Idheva suddhi iti vādayanti (v. 15) = Snp 4.8:1.1 verbatim — the "only here is purity" claim. Paramuggahītan (v. 10) echoes 4.4:8.4 and 4.8:10.4. The closing hitvāna sabbāni vinicchayāni (v. 17) echoes the AV's abandonment-of-judgments formula across 4.3, 4.4.

Mahāniddesa (Mnd 12). Covers all seventeen verses. Standard Niddesa operations: the 62 diṭṭhigatāni imported on sandiṭṭhi; the 13-fold kusala taxonomy on kusalā vadānā; the five-fold purity-sects on diṭṭhe sute sīlavate mute; the vinicchaya-cascade on v. 17's sabbāni vinicchayāni. Mnd 12 is the AV commentary's sustained gloss on the sectarian-debate phenomenology; its content is less ethnographically sharp than Mnd 7 but more doctrinally comprehensive than Mnd 13 on the same theme.

Cross-recensional witnesses

Pāli: full; 17 verses.

Chinese Yizujing YZJ-11 猛觀梵志經 ("Brahmin Mengguan Sūtra") at [T0198_p0182a27]–[T0198_p0182c02]: 17 parallel + 4 added = 21 verses (Lee 2024 Table 2). The frame narrative involves a skeptical brahmin named Meng-guan (猛觀, "Fierce-Observer") in the audience. Four Mahā-Brahmās descend from the Seventh Heaven to witness the Buddha at Kapilavastu; Meng-guan voices doubts about karma; the Buddha conjures a Buddha-double (化作一佛) who recites the debate-critique verses for the assembly. The twin-miracle / Buddha-duplicate framing is the same as at YZJ-10 (Snp 4.11) — the Chinese recension consistently frames the AV's dispute-analysis suttas with self-dialogue narratives in which the Buddha poses the questions via a magical double.

Positional note. Snp 4.12 sits at Yizujing position 11 (Pāli 12 → Chinese 11) — the second of the four position-shifted AV suttas in the Chinese (10, 11, 12, 13 in Chinese = 11, 12, 13, 14 in Pāli). The mechanical one-position forward bump continues.

Sanskrit: not attested. Hoernle 1916 covers Snp 4.7–4.10 only.

Gāndhārī: not attested. The Split Arthapada scroll's coverage ends at Sn 844.

Coverage note. Snp 4.12 is 2-recension at verse-level (Pāli + Chinese), with the Yizujing's Meng-guan frame continuing the Chinese recension's pattern of supplying self-dialogue narratives for the AV's dispute-analysis suttas. Pj II's Mahāsamaya + mano-mayaṁ buddhaṁ framing converges on the same self-dialogue reading — third instance of the pattern after Snp 4.10 and 4.11.

Internal cross-references

Within the AV. Diṭṭhe sute sīlavate mute vā (v. 10 = 4.4:3.2 = 4.5:2.2) — three-sutta verbatim formula. Idheva suddhi iti vādayanti (v. 15) = Snp 4.8:1.1 verbatim. Paramuggahītan in the semantic space of 4.4:8.4 and 4.8:10.4. The sandiṭṭhi-rāga vocabulary at v. 14 echoes 4.3, 4.5's diṭṭhi-debate vocabulary. The closing hitvāna sabbāni vinicchayāni pattern recurs across the cluster.

Cross-AV–PV. The Q-A dispute-analysis format of 4.12 and 4.13 both derive structurally from Snp 4.11's more systematic Q-A regression. The broader pucchā-format linking AV dispute-suttas to the Pārāyaṇa's sixteen question-cycles establishes a cross-vagga inheritance of the dialogue-verse-genre.

Within the Khuddaka. No direct cross-Khuddaka verbatim parallels. Ekañ hi saccaṁ na dutīyam atthi at v. 7 is occasionally cited in later commentarial literature as an AV-diagnostic phrase, but does not appear elsewhere in the canonical texts in this form.

Prose-nikāya uptake. No direct named-citation.

Reception and external attestation

Mahāniddesa: Mnd 12 covers all seventeen verses.

Paramatthajotikā II: Mahāsamaya (DN 20) + mano-mayaṁ buddhaṁ framing, continuous with Pj II's framings for Snp 4.10, 4.11. The Pāli commentarial tradition reads the three consecutive suttas (4.10, 4.11, 4.12) as a single extended Mahāsamaya discourse delivered through a self-dialogue with conjured Buddha-figures.

Aśoka Bhabru edict: not identified.

Peṭakopadesa: no verse of Snp 4.12 is cited in Pe chapter 1's AV-extraction.

Reading

Snp 4.12 is the AV's critique of disputation as such. Where 4.3–4.5 argue against view-attachment at the level of diagnosis and cure, and 4.11 traces its causal chain back to saññā, 4.12 analyses the structure of the debate that view-attachment generates — how sectarians call each other fools, how "various truths" arise from perception-based speculation rather than from objective diversity, how the very criteria by which one claims expertise make one's opponents equally expert. The sutta's argument is intricate and self-reflective: the Buddha refuses both horns of the sectarian-dilemma ("the other is a fool" / "the other is an expert") and names the dispute-structure itself as the problem.

Ekañ hi saccaṁ na dutīyam atthi at v. 7 is the AV's most positive-seeming truth-statement, and its interpretation is consequential. The verse does not say "the Buddha's position is the one truth"; it says that there is one truth and those who know it do not dispute about it while the sectarians who do dispute are proclaiming their variously-adopted positions as truths. Read with the rest of the sutta, the "one truth" is not a positive doctrinal content but the absence-of-position the AV's apophatic stance points to. The dhono / muni / upasanta of 4.10 and elsewhere in the collection holds no disputable position; the "one truth" is what is available to one who does not mistake a variously-adopted position for a found one. Chapter 3 and Chapter 10 return to this reading for the apophasis-vs-right-view-in-apophatic-register question.

Aññatra saññāya niccāni loke at v. 9 is the AV's most directly epistemological statement: apart from perception, there are no eternal truths in the world — the plurality of "truths" is a saññā-based cognitive artifact. The verse links 4.12's dispute-analysis to 4.11's saññā-nidānā papañca-saṅkhā — both locate the root of philosophical proliferation in perception, and both are the AV's closest approaches to the prose-Nikāya's papañca-saññā-saṅkhā vocabulary at MN 18 Madhupiṇḍika. The Mahākaccāna-AV canonical link (Chapter 8) has its thematic foundation at these two verses: Snp 4.11 Sn 874 and Snp 4.12 Sn 886 are the verse-level AV passages that MN 18's prose exegesis by Mahākaccāna expounds.

The Yizujing's Meng-guan frame and Pj II's Mahāsamaya + mano-mayaṁ buddhaṁ framing both supply self-dialogue narratives for this sutta's anonymous Q-A — continuing the pattern established at Snp 4.10 (Mṛgaśiras / Suddhodana / Pj II variations) and Snp 4.11 (twin-miracle / Pj II conjured Buddha). Three consecutive AV suttas, three independent pairs of commentarial framings, each wrapping the verses in the same Buddha-questioning-his-own-manifestation device. The pattern suggests that by the 3rd–5th c. CE both Pāli and Chinese commentarial traditions had independently settled on the conjured-Buddha framing as the natural occasion for the AV's philosophically-loaded Q-A suttas. The verses themselves are silent on who asks; the commentarial traditions converge on the most theologically-respectable answer.

The samatta crux at v. 4 is the AV's cleanest test-case for the Norman-vs-Niddesa reading of the atta family of terms. The past-participle reading (ātta, "adopted, taken up") is AV-consistent — it keeps 4.12 in grammatical family with attaṁ pahāya at 4.3, attā nirattā at 4.3/4.10/4.14/4.15, attañjaho at 4.3 — whereas the abstract-noun reading (sama-tta, "equality") requires one to treat 4.12 as using a different root entirely. Six-out-of-six published translators follow Norman on the ātta reading at 4.3 v. 8; Bodhi and Norman follow it here; Fronsdal departs. The choice at 4.12:4 is thus part of the AV-wide ātta-family question Chapter 4 treats as a stratigraphic marker.